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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

Un positivisme nouveau. E. LEROY. Rev. de Mét., IX, 2, pp. 138–153.

This article is an exposition and defence of the Neo-critical philosophy, a system having birth, "at the threshold of the twentieth century in reaction to those tendencies whose development occupied the middle of the preceding century." This philosophy takes the form of a new Positivism, more realistic, and more confident in the powers of spirit than the first. Thus it is superior to the Positivism of Comte, which was too utilitarian and prone to accept without criticism the attitude of common sense. The Neo-critical philosophy has been misrepresented chiefly in two ways. It has been made out to be on the one hand an abstract intellectualism, on the other a pure æstheticism. Interpreted as an intellectualism, it becomes a mere dialectic and play of concepts which may result in scientific scepticism. Understood æsthetically, it is transformed into a vague mysticism. But in reality the New Critique is a *spiritualism*, since in scientific knowledge it subordinates the lifeless materials which serve as tools and symbols, to the living thought-process itself for which the former furnish a transitory body whose dissolution is survived by the vital activity. This philosophy is a Positivism in that action is for it the supreme criterion. But this action is nothing superficial or external; it is the productive activity of free spirit. It is the living creative form which is operative in true philosophic intuition.

H. W. WRIGHT.

The Law of Historical Intellectual Development. J. S. STUART-GLENNIE. International Monthly, III, 4, pp. 444–463.

Comte's 'Law of the Three Periods," the theological, metaphysical, and scientific, was merely an hypothesis. Subsequent inductive research has resulted in the discovery of the character of the primitive conceptions of nature, the conditions of the origin of civilization, and the stages of intellectual development. Man's primitive consciousness is characterized by

two sets of conceptions: those occasioned by sensations and synthetizing objects and persons, as sentient powers; and those occasioned by emotions mythicizing the more impressive objects, persons, and events, as supernal (not as yet supernatural) beings. The classes of supernal beings are actual objects and persons with a mythical atmosphere about them; personalized characteristics of objects, persons, and events; and finally traditional objects and persons, in mythical shapes. Whether things are conceived as sentient powers or as supernal beings, they are regarded as subject to quantitatively undetermined influences. Progressive civilization originated as a result of the conflict of higher and lower races. In order to maintain their rule, the higher races were forced to devote their leisure to intellectual work. The history of intellectual development describes an advance from a quantitatively undetermined to a quantitatively determined notion of universal interaction. The conditions which gave rise to this movement gave rise also to magic. And magic in turn transformed the supernal into supernatural beings. The historical stages are first, the incipient development of the antagonisms latent in primitive panzoist conceptions; secondly, the definite differentiation and determined conflict of the naturalist and supernaturalist conceptions, beginning with the substitution of moral for religious customs in the sixth century B. C.; and thirdly, a stage marked by the victory of a more adequate naturalism distinguished by verified conceptions of a quantitatively determined universal interaction.

N. E. TRUMAN.

On Physiological, as Distinguished from Geometrical Space. E. MACH. Monist, XI, 3, pp. 321–338.

The sensible space of immediate perception differs widely from geometrical space. Both spaces, it is true, are threefold manifoldnesses. To every point of geometric space, A, B, C, there corresponds a point A', B', C', in sensible space, in such a way that if B lie between A and C, then B' lies between A' and C'. These two characteristics, however, exhaust about all that they have in common. Sensible space consists of a system of feelings evoked by physiological organs, and is best described as a sort of vague voluminousness in which our sense-impressions are located, and often very inaccurately located. It is a qualitative manifold determined at every point by reference to sensations in our individual bodies; above differs from below, before from behind, and right from left. Experiences of untrammelled orientation and progressive movement in all directions enable us, however, to form the abstract notion of a space equal in all directions, infinite in extent, and identically constituted at every point. This is geometrical space; not a simple sense-experience, but an abstract ideally accurate system of points, lines, and figures. Thus arrived at, however, geometrical space is never able to supplant sensible space in actual perception, and that simply because it is phylogenetically and ontogenetically older and stronger. Even in our abstract mathematical reason-

ing this is also true. The straight line, the plane, and the Cartesian coordinates, according as they are reckoned to the right or the left, upward or downward, are constructed with reference to our sensitive feeling bodies. This may not be necessary, but only convenient, but it is convenient only because of the primacy of sensible over geometrical space. It was undoubtedly this fact of the primacy of sensible space which led Kant to regard space not as a concept, nor as a pure form of thought, but as a pure form of intuition. Kant did not see, however, that this basis is unquestionably inadequate to the development of geometry, inasmuch as concepts, and even concepts derived from experience, are also needed for this purpose. IRA MACKAY.

Psycische Vorgänge und psychishe Causalität. TH. LIPPS. Z.f. Ps.u. Phys. d. Sinn., XXV, 3, pp. 161–203.

Psychology is not alone concerned with the mere description of psychical phenomena ; it is chiefly interested in establishing and formulating the laws underlying these phenomena and their relations to one another. These relations may be viewed from various standpoints. From the standpoint of a physiological materialism, the causal relation does not hold directly between the conscious process as such, but is mediated by brain processes. Whatever, says Lipps, the physiological substrate of the psychical process may be, we only know the psychical. Psychology is not physiology. The causal relation, so far as the psychologist is concerned with it, is a psychical relation. The author makes a distinction here between psychical processes and contents of consciousness. The causal relation obtains only between the former, and not between the latter. In other words, 'reals' may stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, *i. e.*, all psychical causality belongs to the realm of the unconscious. The contents of consciousness, the elements which we find in consciousness, are sensations and feelings, and the ideas corresponding to these, the ideas of form and relation, and the relation between the object and the ego as directly experienced. Between these we cannot predicate a causal relation. The unconscious elements, which alone are the bearers of psychical causality are the processes underlying sensation and perception, the real temporal and factual relations of the same to each other, and finally the 'psyche' itself with its general condition and tendencies. Neither of these two classes of psychical factors is interchangeable. The psychology which goes beyond mere description builds from the 'real' factors a 'real' psychical causal relation. CARRIE R. SQUIRE.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

La mémoire affective : son importance théorique et practique. F. PILLON. Rev. Ph., XXVI, 2, pp. 113–138.

It is by means of the memory that any sensations are conserved in order to be revived in the state of images (in the broad sense of the term). The

diversity of memory being granted, one is led to ask if there is not also an affective memory, as there is a visual or auditory memory. Such a memory has been recognized in greater or less degree, and has been explained in diverse ways by Spencer, Bain, Höffding, and Ribot. James attaches slight importance to it. Affective states undergo various degrees of abstraction. When abstract and general, the affective memory does not retain its affective nature, but should not be called false (Ribot). When concrete and vivid (as in the presence of objects), the affective tone is present in high degree. In this concrete revival there are three factors : (1) the visual sensation of the object, (2) images of the old sensations (association by similarity), and (3) images of old feelings recalled by the old sensations which accompanied these feelings (association by contiguity). The new and the old ideals may combine to form a new result (the illusion of Höffding). There is a distinction between voluntary and involuntary revival, the latter having the stronger affective value. Association is present in both, the latter again being stronger. When ideas are separate they are quite distinct ; when feelings are separated they become obscure, they are more dependent upon association, and are inseparably bound up with ideal sensations. Not only sensations but associations by similarity and contiguity may arouse affective memories (Ferri and Fouillée). Since feeling is a basis of mentality and since mind evolves, the affective memory must play a part in evolution. It is stronger in women than men, with whom memory is more intellectual. In religion the affective memory is a strong conservative force, and is again stronger in women than men. This is shown in the difficulty experienced in any change in religion where the new feelings can only gradually supplant the old. Religious and moral education is a training of the proper affective memories.

FLORENCE M. WINGER.

ETHICAL.

The True Significance of Sidgwick's "Ethics." F. H. HAYWARD. Int. J. E., XI, 2, pp. 175–187.

In this article the writer presents in brief the leading features of Sidgwick's ethical system, and indicates what he believes to be its fundamental inconsistency. In aims and sympathies Sidgwick was an empiricist of the traditional English line, ever refusing to associate himself with the prevalent idealistic movement. His preëminent merit was absolute fairness along with keen critical acumen ; his chief defect, absence of constructive power. This characteristic fairness failed in one direction only. With idealism he had little sympathy, and consequently treats it in a perfunctory and inadequate manner. He was by nature an eclectic, and endeavored to comprehend in his own system the grain of truth which he found in every other. In his synthesis he includes even elements of intuitionism. With Kant he interprets 'right' in the sense of 'rational,' and admits the notion of 'oughtness' to be ultimate and unanalyzable. Further, he

allows that reason can act as a motive of the will, and in his maxim of 'justice' approaches close to the Categorical Imperative. In all this, he is at direct variance with all consistent Hedonists. Nevertheless, he always remained a nominal Hedonist, clinging to the view that the *summum bonum* can be expressed only in terms of happiness. To determine Sidgwick's true position, we must observe what he considers to be the *motive* of action. The motive to the performance of an act he finds in its *reasonableness*. Moreover, his utilitarianism is based upon a formal principle of abstract reason. We may then conclude that Sidgwick was not a true Hedonist. This system he preferred, but such was his fairness and ability, that he refused to overlook its fatal inadequacies and contradictions. In the attempt to remedy these he introduced a rational element, which left his system no longer Hedonistic. H. W. WRIGHT

Les principes universels de l'education morale. A. LALANDE. Rev. de Mét., IX, 2, pp. 237–249.

M. Lalande here attempts to defend the teachers of ethics against the popular accusation that divergence of opinion is too great among them to admit of the recognition of a common body of truth. He admits that professional moralists to an extent deserve the charge because of the tendency of each to emphasize his own original contribution to ethical theory. But the very fact that the great majority of moralists refuse to have recourse to the supernatural, testifies to the existence among them of a common body of doctrine over which there is no dispute, representing the moral principles common to Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Spencer, and the other great thinkers, despite their difference in metaphysical theory. In truth, the principles of morality are not derived from metaphysical theory. Rather these theories are advanced as hypotheses to systematize those judgments of value immediately given. These judgments of value, universally recognized, constitute the basis upon which the metaphysical theory is constructed. An adequate metaphysics would supply the *ratio essendi* of these moral values, but it is the latter which are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the former. To furnish conclusive proof of his position M. Lalande endeavors to formulate a system of universal principles held in common by all moralists and recognized as self-evident by every one. These are presented in the form of ten personal qualities or virtues which the moral judgment holds to be necessary to any character which it approves. The fundamental and self-evident nature of these principles justifies the moral teacher in inculcating them in the mind of his pupil before he is able to appreciate their significance in the same mechanical manner by which the multiplication table is taught. In addition to these universal principles, there are other precepts which are dependent upon the natural and social conditions to which the individual must adapt himself. So the writer appends a list of seven of these principles dictated by national conditions. The relative nature of these principles forbids the use of the 'maternal' method of instruction ap-

propriate to the principles of the first category. When the pupil has acquired the use of his reason, these precepts should be presented by the teacher along with the arguments which recommend their acceptance.

H. W. WRIGHT.

The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick. JAMES SETH. Mind, No. 38, pp. 172–187.

In the *Methods of Ethics*, Sidgwick attempts to reconcile the various conflicting views with a larger and more inclusive truth. He has endeavored to make Ethics a science, but not merely a science; it must be an art as well; and the business of the philosopher is to tell men what they ought to think rather than what they do think. Sidgwick's method and influences were distinctively English. His criticisms are from within—the system is made to criticise itself. The criticism is not merely destructive, it is for the sake of a later synthesis. Sidgwick finds several points of view implied in our ordinary moral judgments, and this plurality of standpoints, he thinks, explains the inadequacy of any ethical theory which is constructed from a single point of view. There are three fundamental methods of Ethics or ultimate points of view taken by the ordinary conscience, viz., Egoism, Intuitionism, and Utilitarianism. The result of Sidgwick's recognition of these three methods of Ethics as equally legitimate, comes to be by his treatment apart from his theological assumption, Rational or Intuitional Hedonism, rather than Rational or Intuitional Utilitarianism. With the theological postulate, it is in the last analysis Rational Egoism. If we invalidate Egoism, it is easy to reconcile Utilitarianism with Intuitionism and thus show the rationality of altruistic conduct. If the point of view of the individual and his happiness is once exchanged for the point of view of society and the general happiness, if the principle of prudence is subordinated to the principle of benevolence, or if both are subordinated to the principle of justice, the dualism and contradiction of ethical thought disappears, and Utilitarianism is seen to be the only rational principle of conduct, the only principle worthy of being called intuitive. The question of the validity of the hedonistic interpretation of the good still remains. Sidgwick's main interest was in regard to the distribution of the good, rather than in the nature of that good. His investigation of the problem of the good is much less satisfactory than his investigation of the problem of its distribution.

G. W. T. WHITNEY.

Les principes de la morale.—I. Le souverain bien. CH. DUNAN. Rev. Ph., XXVI, 3, pp. 261–279.

There have been three conceptions of the moral ideal, and a fourth seems impossible. The Greeks, Scholastics, and Moderns, until Kant, held to that of the Sovereign Good. Kant insisted on the priority of Duty, and made the Good derivative. Finally, empirical systems have rejected the notion of an absolute, and made the completest possible satis-

faction of our tendencies the ethical end. The writer chooses of these forms the first, which involves the founding of ethics upon metaphysic, since the search for the Good involves the determination of what natural perfection is. Being is action, and therefore perfection is harmony of a being with itself, which involves harmony with its universal environment. The search for the Universal Good is therefore the search for the Absolute. The empirical ethicists would insist that we stop with the contingent. But Cyrenaic pursuit of passing pleasure had to yield to the doctrine of *utility*, which is only a halting compromise between Cyrenaic pluralism and the absolute solidarity already asserted ; as there is solidarity in the functions of an individual, so is there in his interests and those of his fellows ; so that for individual interest must be substituted general interest, and logic pushes this beyond even the limits of humanity to involve the whole universe. But the notion of *interest* and that of *universality* are incompatible, and thus the vicious abstraction of utilitarianism is apparent. Utilitarianism is also unable to conciliate egoism and altruism ; Bentham identified them, Mill opposed them to each other ; both positions are mistaken, for differing interests are *qua* interests irreconcilable. The relation between egoism and altruism can only be solved by solving the problem of individuation. The will to be, which underlies all our life, implies the will to be by and of one's self, a desire which is futile in a finite being. The necessary condition for the happiness of such a being is its union with all creation, or with God its soul ; to save one's life one must give it up to find it again in God. There is thus a true and a false self-love ; the false excludes, the true involves, love of others. One must see in his fellows co-members of the whole ; egoism and altruism are reconcilable only in the love of the universal, the love of God, which leads us to strive for the development of both our own personality and that of others. Thus, in morals as in the world and the process of thought itself, we find the apparent antinomy and real union of the Infinite and the Finite, the One and the Many, the Universal and the Particular. As we must not lose the individual person in the universal, neither must we deny its value to pleasure, which at first appears as opposed to the Supreme Good. Pleasure is not the Good, but it makes the Good 'multiple, sensible, and real' ; it results from the exercise of a particular function, but expresses the Good which consists in the subordination of this function to the whole. We must then insist on the hierarchy of functions and pleasures, as against the Utilitarians' atomistic equalization and isolation of functions ; Mill indeed recognized qualitative distinctions in pleasures, but in contradiction to his system which recognized no hierarchy of functions. True morality is—to prefer higher pleasures to lower. 'Virtue is to will one's self, but in one's true nature, which is through union with the Absolute.'

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Les principes de la morale.—II. La conscience morale. CH. DUNAN. Rev. Ph., XXVI, 4, pp. 360–384.

The preceding article has defined the greatest good as the unity of a reasonable being with itself and the universe. This is to be sought under the guidance of conscience. Common sense defines conscience as a sort of revelation or light invariable in all men. Conscience is, however, a form of reason, and facts clearly disprove its invariability and infallibility. Its function is to point out the actions most suited to realize the unity of our own being and the universe. Spencer would also define morality and happiness as an adaptation as perfect as possible of our actions to the universal laws of nature; but his universe is a sum of parts, without metaphysical unity. This lack of teleological unity destroys his evolutionary account of conscience; it also reduces his appeal to experience to a position which is one with the utilitarianism of Mill, which, however, he disclaims. His empiricism can never found an universal morality. The remaining at one with oneself and with nature, is the formula of life as well as of ethics. Life is really a mutual subordination to each other of the living being and nature, and the problems of life and of ethics are one. Life is the more or less perfect unification, produced by the living being itself, of nature in one of its aspects. From the struggle between the various existent beings, and the consequent adaptations, arise time and space. The principle of life is thus both a conserving and a transforming principle. The unity of physical and mental life is certain; but in consciousness we see two stages, the merely sensory in the animal, and the reflective in man. It is of the nature of the latter to form ideal concepts, and in the subordination of the senses to these ideals consists the moral life. The realisation of the relativity of the merely physical is, however, not the abolition but the perfection of life; conscience is but a higher form of the vital principle. Its adaptations and unifications vary as do those in the physical realm; it differs as the intelligence of its owner, and the demands of morality vary. Conscience, however, unlike mere instinct, is progressive, and the moral life must either rise or fall. There is much truth in the account of its evolution given by Darwin and Spencer, though not in their derivation of altruism from egoism. Morality being progressive, moral proselytism is commendable, but as morality is a varying adaptation, the conscience of another must be respected often when lower than that of the would-be adviser. EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

The Theory of Value and its Place in the History of Ethics. CHARLES GRAY SHAW. Int. J. E., XI, 3, pp. 306–320.

Except in the work of Lotze and of Nietzsche, ethics has not, like economics and theology, developed a theory of value. The ancient view of life was æsthetic; good was an objective reality; virtue a subjective attitude; and no end was set before the ethical subject. The modern view of life is dynamic; the world is a system of energies; the ideal is perfect

functioning; and right is the method of attaining an undefined end. Where ancient thought perceived no problem, modern thought has found no solution. Present ethical tendencies are likewise in want of the valuational idea. Intuitionism has made ethics a distinct science, yet independent judgments of right are formal, and the motto "duty for duty's sake" vitiates the practical force of the method. The principles of Hedonism emancipated modern life. Moral conduct is regarded as desirable and there is an approximation to the idea of value. But, owing to a defective analysis of the affectional process, the development has remained incomplete. The value-principle however has had an influence in history. Bentham's system involved the idea; but his interpretation of value is a mixture of mathematics and traditional psychology. Kant showed how independent judgments of value may be made, but neglected the attendant psychological conditions. Psychologically, value and desire, though related, are independent of each other. Pleasure has reference to the present; desire to the future; value is not restricted by temporal limits. The value-principle determines the will; but its affinity for the two other forms of conscious life is expressed in judgments of value. Ethically, the 'desirable', if equivalent to the 'valuable', must not be interpreted in Hedonistic terms. Moral conduct should produce results. The end of life is to realize destiny. Metaphysically, both the subject and the object of valuation, the personal ego and the moral-world order, are essential. Value is actively concerned and ethical relations are constructive and real. N. E. TRUMAN.

Current Sociology. SYDNEY BALL. Mind, No. 38, pp. 145–171.

The writer asks if sociology is really a science or only a name for a science which has not yet come into existence. He is of the opinion that sociology is a word which denotes a great group of problems waiting for solution rather than any compact and systematic body of doctrine. It will not stand Comte's test for a positive science, that is, the test of consensus and continuity. There seems to be no agreement as to the principles, province, or method of sociology, while the predictions of sociologists carry disagreement to the verge of incompatibility. Comte excluded psychology from the method of sociology. Modern sociology is psychological, abstract, and theoretical. The one thing that is common to the sociology that prevails is its emphatic rejection of the biological method. Society must be construed not as an organism but as a psychological organization. The American sociologists agree with the French and Germans in this. The writer thinks that there is loss as well as gain in this. "Whatever may have been the shortcomings of biological sociologists, they were at least aware of the difference between a mere juxtaposition of individuals, and that kind of coöperative structure we call a society; and it is just the idea of the social organism that imitation between individuals does not so much as even suggest." No merely psychological account of morality can sat-

isfy the requirements of theory. Morality is not a mere psychological process; it depends upon a capacity for moral ideas which rest in the last resort on the growing recognition of an order or system of life which we do not make, which is greater than ourselves, and yet is what we ourselves most desire. The formation of such a view involves other agencies than imitation.

G. W. T. WHITNEY.

HISTORICAL.

Beiträge zur Erklärung Platonischer Lehren und zur Würdigung des Aristotles. RICHARD WAHLE. Ar. f. G. Ph., XIV, 2, pp. 145–155.

The word 'idea' used to express changeless being is misleading. We understand by idea something known as an element in knowledge. Only when the γένος, εἶδος, and ἰδέα, are not absolute, but are in our consciousness, which according to Plato is seldom the case, are they ideas in the modern sense of the word. They were logical expressions which could be applied to all that had being. One must agree with Aristotle in the conclusion that the theory of ideas was occasioned by ontological and epistemological demands, notwithstanding the fact that it later attained a relation to ethics. The world was not created out of nothing. The Demiurge found the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and the principles of becoming and differentiation already present. It is probable that the Demiurge is no real metaphysical power. Since Plato had all forms of being and becoming for the construction of the world and its soul, the Demiurge could be only the personification of the force manifest in the evolution of these forms. Plato did not regard the popular gods as real. More difficult are the expressions regarding the nature of the ideas; yet we must conclude that his 'ultimate forms' have force and life. The world-soul is a permanent existence made up of the totality of ideas, types, or forms. Since the individual soul which is derived from the world-soul has consciousness, the latter must also have consciousness. Aristotle, contrary to common opinion, stands in complete dependence upon his teacher, and has introduced no new moment into philosophy.

N. E. TRUMAN.